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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE IN-1 
SURAN CE COMP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. ) 
JAM1£S E. CAINE, dba Caine Agency, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10940 
R~.JSPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
ri_io THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO 
'l'HE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The Petitioner respectfully requests a rehearing in 
the above entitled cause and that the decision be modi-
fied as hereinafter suggested, for the reasons and upon 
the grounds following: 
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1. The decision of this Court to i·everse the decision 
of the trial court is based upon grounds not argued bv 
either party and npon which Respondent has had n~ 
opportunity to be heard. 
2. That the decision of this Court and the con. 
curring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett reversing the 
judgment of the trial court are based, in part, upon a 
misunderstanding of the record. 
3. That the decision of this Court and the concur-
ring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett places the blame 
upon the Respondent for the long delay in submitting 
findings and judgment to the trial court, which blame 
appears to have influenced the majority decision. The 
record does not support placing this blame upon the 
Respondent. 
\VHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully submits that 
a rehearing should be had and the decision revised, be· 
lieving that a re-examination of the record will assist 
the court better to understand the record certified, and 
will result in a revision and reversal of the decision 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND 
TAYLOR 
By -----------------------------------------·--
J. Grant Iverson 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT TO REVERSE 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS BASED 
UPON GROUNDS NOT ARGUED BY EITHER 
PARTY, AND UPON WHICH RESPONDENT HAS 
NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. 
11he Appellant argued his case under three points, 
(1) that the trial court erred in considering the two depo-
sitions ( of Mr. Mortensen and Mr. Cosby) in its deci-
sion; (2) the trial court erred in granting judgment 
against Caine for $6,762 with no accounting records, no 
testimony as to the conclusion reached and no evidence 
of any type or description as to how the money judgment 
was determined; and (3) where there is no competent 
evidence in a law case to warrant the Findings of Fact 
and Decision, the Supreme Court may interfere and hold 
the findings and decision void. 
As to Appellant's Point 1: 
Neither Justice Tuckett nor Chief Justice Crockett 
made any reference thereto. J nstice Ellett, in his dis-
fi('nting opinion, iminkd out that the trial court did not 
en in considering the depositions. 
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As to Appellant's Point 2: 
It is true that when Appellant filed his brief th
1
, 
record did not contain "any accounting records nor te8ti. 
rnony as to the conclusion reached and no evidence of 
any type or description as to how the money judgment 
\
1.ras determined." However, the trial court certified i
11 
its Order for Transmittal of Evidence Omitted fro 111 
Record on Appeal for Inclusion on Appeal "from \!11: 
evidence, arguments and affidavits and from the ConrL 
recollE~ction of the proceedings" those matters whicl1 
answered Appellant's Point 2. 
This order recites in part: 
"At said hearing one Jack Fletcher, treasurer 
and keeper of the financial records of Reliance 
National Life Insurance Company, was sworn and 
testified from Plaintiff's records in his posses· 
sion, reflecting the status of the account betwM 
Reliance National Lifr Insurance Company and 
James E. Caine. That from said records, the sairl 
Jack Fletcher testified that the Defendant Jamei 
E. Caine was indebtt>d to the Pltintiff Reliance 
National Life Insurance Company as of the datr 
of said trial in the amount of $6,762.73." 
However, Justice r:i~uckett stated: 
"The Defendant here contends that the findingi 
and judgment of the Court are not supporttrl 
by the evidence at the trial." 
Is it true that the order above quoted does not 811JI 
port the judgment~ 
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Is it not usual for a witness testifying to an account 
and having the records in his possession to state that 
he has checked the account as disclosed by the records, 
and that by so doing determined that A is indebted to 
B in a certain amonnU If the other side does not cross-
l'xamine, is the evidence insufficienU 
The trial court stated (R. 287) : 
"H is clear in my mind as to what took placl~ 
at the hearing of this matter. Mr. Davis says that 
John Farr Larsen, that he does not recall cross-
examining him, but my recollection is that we had 
a - he had these books and records here, testified, 
and after we got through we either had a recess, 
either for the same day or a future day, to give 
Mr. Larsen a chance to go into these records. 
That is my recollection that we had these records 
here and Mr. Larsen was interested in those rec-
ords." (R. 286-287) 
It may be true that Mr. Larsen did not cross-exam-
ine, but he did have Richmond, Jones and Anderson, 
certified public accountants, prepare an audit report 
from the records of Reliance dated July 30, 1956, which 
\li:,;dmws that Caine owed Respondent approximately 
the same amount as Fletcher testified to, and the trial 
court ordered Respondent to pay Richmond, Jones and 
Anderson $695 for preparing the audit. (R. 166) 
Respondent will discuss this audit hereafter. 
As to AppeUant's Point 3: 
The opinions of Justices Tuckett and Ellett and 
Chief Justice Crockett make no reference to this point. 
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POINT II. 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT AND THE CON-
CURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE CROCK-
ETT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE BASED, IN PART, UPON A MISUN-
DERSTANDING OF THE RECORD. 
Chief Justice Crockett stated: 
"It (opinion of .Justice Tuckett) does not tah 
the position that the judgment is invalid, bu! 
simply that on the state of the record it is impo~­
sible to tell whether it is valid and sustainable or 
not ... 
" ( 1) Where there are essential issues which it i~ 
impossible to review properly because of the un-
satisfactory state of the record and 
" ( 2) ·where this situation appears largely due\o 
the fault of the Plaintiff, I agree that 
" ( 3) the ends of justice will be best served by 
remanding the case for trial." 
Respondent wishes to discuss the above statements 
(1), (2) and (3). 
Justice Tnckett referred to a stipulation in whicl1 
the parbes agreed that before an accounting could be 
made from the books of the company, it was first neces-
sary that the Conrt determine certain matters of lair 
relating to the forfeiture provision of the contract, and 
that a part of the stipulation was: 
"That before the matter can he properly and fully 
adjudicated, tht~ Conrt mnst decide whethrr the 
('vid<>nce is such as to require a forfiturc a.s ~'.; 
scribed in Paragraph 10 of the agency snperv1soJ, 
contract." 
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Justice rruckett further stated: 
"It would appear that Caine"s contention was 
that Reliance had breached the contract and that, 
by reason of the breach, Reliance was barred from 
declaring a forfeiture. 
" ( 1) Whatever evidence was before the Court 
respecting this matter is no longer available. 
"It will be noted that the efforts of Court and 
counsel to supply by affidavit and a certificate a 
r!:'cord of testimony which supports the Court's 
findings and judgment only to go to one issue 
of fact. 
"(2) It appears that there are other issues upon 
which the Court undoubtedly took testimony and 
upon which findings should have been made, but 
that testimony is not here for review." 
Justice Tuckett also stated: 
"(3) An important fact in this case is that the 
long delay in submitting findings and judgment to 
the Court by the prevailing party contributed to 
the impossibility of obtaining a transcript of the 
testimony at the time of appeal." 
Respondent desires to discuss the above statements 
(1), (2) and (3). 
Respondent has indicated an intention to discuss 
Justice Tuckett's statements (1), (2) and (3) and Chief 
Justice Crockett's statements (1), (2) and (3). 
All of said statements relate to this point - mis-
understanding of the record. However, Chief Justice 
Crockett's statement (2) and Justice Tuckett's statement 
\3) are tlw subject of Petitioner's Point III and will be 
8 
discussed under Point III, leaving Chief Justice Crock 
ett's statements (1) and (3) and Justice Tnckett's stat(' 
rnents (1) and (2) to be discussed under this Point u 
As to Justice Tuckett's Statement (1): 
.T ustice Tuckett stated: 
"It wonld appear that Caine's contention was thal 
Reliance had breached the contract and that 1n 
' ' reason of the breach, Reliance was barred from 
declaring a forfeiture. Whatever evidence wa1 
before the Court respecting this matter 1s no 
longer available." 
No evidence was introduced upon this matter. 
Defendant stipulated on November 23, 1960 (R. 29) 
before the Memorandum Decision was entered on Jann· 
ary 5, 1961 (R. 25-26), that if the Court df'cides that 
the forfeiture provision should be invoked, "We havP 
no issue of fact." (R. 29) 
Defendant stated (R. 29) : 
"W onld a prior hr<'ach b~, Plaintiff bar the appll· 
cation of the forfoitm<' provision of the agency 
supervisor's contract if they were otherwise appli-
cable? Defondant 's position. Yes. 
"In substance, Defondant alleges and Plaintiff 
denies that on several occasions Plaintiff withheld 
from Defendant certain commissions. If the Court 
determines this question of law in the affinnatiYl', 
then we have a question of fact as to whrther 
there was a breach, and Defendant should .br 
permitted to offer his evidPnce on this point, '~'It:: 
Plaintiff permitted to rebut. If the Court drcidt .. 
this question in the n0gativt>, we have no issne 01 
fact." 
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The trial court in the Memo rand nm Decision stated: 
"That any prior breach by the plaintiff, if any, 
would not be a bar to the application of the for-
feiture provision of the agency supervisor's con-
tract." (R. 25) 
Thereafter Defendant did not attempt to put in evidence 
anything on this matter. 
As to Chief Justice Crockett's statement (1) and 
Justice Tuckett's Statement (2): 
Chief Justice Crockett ::;tated that m the state of 
t11l' record it is impossible to tell whether the judgment 
of the trial court is valid and sustainable or not 
" ( 1) where there are essential issues which it 
is impossible to review properly because of the 
unsatisfactory state of the record." 
J nstice Tuckett stated: 
"It will be noted that the efforts of Court and 
counsel to supply by affidavit and a certificate 
a record of testimony which supports the Court's 
findings and judgment only go to one issue of 
fact. 
"(2) It appears that there are other issues upon 
which the Court undoubtedly took testimony and 
npon which findings should have been made, but 
that testimony is not here for review." 
If there had been such i::;snes and testimony thereon, 
~hould not tlw Dt'fendant have made an effort to supply 
the record therPon i (Rule 75 ( rn) Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure). 
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There were only three other issues. Upon these, 
two were issues upon which findings were made (thi 
forfeiture problem and the duty to account question). 
rrhe third issue (the bonus commission) is of little im. 
portance and is included in the issue of the amount 
owing by Defendant. 
A careful consideration of Defendant's 8tatemen\ 
of the Case dated November 23, 1960 (R. 27-32) 11ill 
disclose that Defendant did not introduce evidence upon 
any other issue than those plainly before the Conrt 
in the record. Defendant in said Statement of the Ca~~ 
fully discussed these issues. He stated (R. 28): 
"Howeyer, it has been apparent to both partie~ 
that the matter cannot be properly dispo8ed ol 
until the Court determines certain questions o! 
law and fact. With these matters determined, th~ 
controversy should be easily solved. 
"Matters to be Determined: 
"The basis question in this lawsuit is to determinr· 
the status of the account between the parties, i.e., 
who owes who and how much. 
"The account between the parties cannot be asC'l'T· 
tained until certain other matters are determined 
by the Court. These matters revolve around (1) 
The Bonus Comimssion, (2) The Forfeiture Prob· 
lem, (3) The Duty to Account Question." 
It will be noted that in Defendant's Statement ol 
the Case of November 23, 1963, reference is not made to 
any other issues (R. 27, 32). 
As to (1), the Bonus Commission, Richmond and 
Jones calculated in its audit report of July 30, 19G~, 
11 
the bonus co11urnss10n to be $645.32 for the period of 
F1•hrnary l, 195G to December 31, 195G. Defendant ter-
111inn tPd his contract as of August 20, 1956 and would not 
lw entitled to receive bonus commission thereafter. Thus, 
tlw honns commission should be calculated only from 
Febrnary l, 1956 to August 20, 1956. Upon a pro rata 
basis (seven of the twelve months, February through 
Angust) this commission would be $376.39 
lfrspondent admits that Appellant is entitled to 
l1onns eornmission from February 1, 1956 to August 20, 
195G - $376.39. 
As to (2), the Forfeiture Problem, this has been 
<lisrnssPd above under Justice Tuckett's statement (1). 
TlH' .Memorandum Decision included: 
"The evidence indicates clearly that the forfeiture 
provision should be applied." 
It was applied in the Findings, Conclusions and 
.Tudguwnt (R. 47-52). 
"\s to (3), the Duty to Account, Ap1wllant argues 
(R. 31): 
''May an insurance cornpany having a duty to 
account ... which fails or refuses to provide an 
accounting ... and as a result such employee is 
l'l'quin•d to have the account audited ... be re-
quin·cl to pay the costs of such audit1" 
The Conrt ordered the Respondent to pay the 
aeconntants $(i73.00 for th<>ir services and the judgment 
SO JlrOYidPS. 
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As to Chief Justice Crockett's statement (3): Chiel 
Justice Crockett stated: 
"I agree that the ends of justice will be besl 
served by remanding the case for trial." 
The audit introduced by the Appellant, together witn 
the fact that Caine resigned on August 20, 1956 (Ex 
D-3), discloses that Defendant is indebted to Respondent 
in the approximate amount of Respondent's judgment 
$G,7G2.73. Richmond, Jones and Anderson, CPA's (hen 
inafter referred to as R J & A) employed by Appellant 
submitted the audit report dated July 30, 1960, two day~ 
before the hearing of August 1, 1960, of which we haw 
a transcript. On the last page of the transcript appears 
a question by the Court concerning the reasonableness 
of $G95.00 charged for the audit. That is the amount thr 
judgment provides that Respondent pay to R J & A 
During the hearing of January 11, 1968, counsel for 
Respondent stated: 
"Richmond and ,J ont>s did submit an audit." 
to which the Con rt answered: 
27): 
"Right". (R. 29) 
Appellant in his Statement of the Case, stated (R. 
"The books were audited by Richmond, Jones and 
Anderson." 
and at R-31 stated: 
"Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with. an 
' mreo accounting and as a n~snlt Defendant was 1eq 
to have an audit made." 
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This audit discloses: 
Creditt; for commissions earned by Caine (Exhibit 1): 
February --------------------------------------------------$ 558.88 
March --------------·---------·-------·---·------------------- 1,422.86 
April -----------------------------------------·---------------- 19,643.12 
Nf ay ----------------------------------------·--------------··--- 2,846.69 
June ----------------------------------------------------·------- 3,052.41 
J nly --------------------·-----------·--------------------------- 4,032.60 
August ------------------------------------------------------ 3,643.21 
Septembe1· ------------------------------------------------ 4,426.11 
October ----------------------------··--·-·-···--··----··--·-· 2,677 .16 
November ----------·-·····----------------------···-------- 1,628.50 
December -----·-------------------------------------------- 3,825. 71 
1957 
January ------------------------------------------------------ 800.62 
Total commissions earned by 
Caine --------------------------------------------------$48,567 .87 
Credits to Caine (Exhibit A) : 
Commissions earned (as above) __________ $48,567.87 
Director's fee -------------------------------------------- 10.00 
Bonus -------------------------------------------------------- 645.34 
0Yerwrite premiums not account for____ 1,987.75 
'l'otal credits to Caine 
shown by audit --------------------------------$51,210.96 
These credits include commissions earned, 
bonuses and overwrite premiums credited to 
Caine after his resignation on August 20, 1956. 
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Charges against Cai1w (Exhibit A): 
Advances to agents --------------------------------$15,866.89 
Advances to J arnt•s E. Caine ________________ 14,850.00 
Telephone calls ---------------------------------------- 169.68 
United Airlines ---------------------------------------- 258.24 
Plans, Hennings, Draper, etc ________________ 356.38 
Legal, Fabian Clendenin, etc. ______________ 1,560.00 
Advertising ---------------------------------------------- 118.68 
Trave 1 -------------------------------------------------------- 1,596. 72 
Returned clwcks - commercial 
chargebacks ---------------------------------------------- 349.69 
Commissions retained ---------------------------- 550.52 
Agents balances charged to 
J. E. Caine ------------------------------------------------ 2,962.89 
Totals charges ----------------------------------$43,581.69 
Deductions for commissions earned, bonus, 
and overwrite premiums credited to Caine 
after he resigned: 
Commissions earned: 
Sept<~mber ----------------------------------------$ 4,426.11 
Octoh0r ---------------------------------------------- 2,677.lG 
November -----------------------------------------· 1,628.50 
December ------------------------------------------ 3,825.71 
1957 
Jan nary -------------------------------------------- 800.62 
Bonuses (5/12 of $G45.32 for months 
of ReptPmber to Jan nary, inclusive__ 268.90 
Overwrit<-> premiums (5/12 of $1,987.75 
for months of September to January, 
inclusive) ---------------------------------------------- 828.30 
$14,455.30 
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'L1otal charges against Caine (Exhibit A)----$4:3,581.69 
Deductions for commissions, bonus, and 
overwrite credited to Caine after he 
resigned ------------------------------------------------------------ 14,455.30 
Total charges against Caine ----------------$58,036.99 
Total charg<>s and deductions against 
Cairn: (Set~ next above) ----------------------------------$58,036.99 
'l'otaL eredits to Caine (see above) ____________ $51,210.96 
Net owing by Caine to Respondent ----$ G,826.03 
~d owing by Caine as per audit ----------------$ 6,826.03 
,Judgment entered against Caine ---------------- G,762.73 
Difference between audit and 
judgment --------------------------------------------------$ 63.30 
As stated above, the audit discloses approximately 
the same amount due to Respondent as the judgment 
<'ntered in its favor. 
Respondent submits that the ends of justice will 
not be best served by requiring a retrial when the De-
fendant's evidence discloses that Defendant is indebted 
to Plaintiff in approximately the same amount as judg-
ment. This is particularly true when it is now nearly 
eight years since this case was tried. The witnesses are 
scattered, Respondent has passed through a corporate 
nlPrger, and it is most unlikely that the books and 
records can again be produced which were produced 
at the hearing in 1960. In any event, it will cast a very 
heavy hnrd<>n of effort and a heavy expenditure of money 
upon the Plaintiff to retry the case, with the probability 
that the Plaintiff will be unable to furnish the evidence 
again. 
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POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT AND THE CON-
CURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE CROCK-
ETT PLACES THE BLAME UPON THE RESPOND-
ENT FOR THE LONG DELAY IN SUBMITTING 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT TO THE TRIAL 
COURT, WHICH BLAME APPEARS TO HA VE IN-
FLUENCED THE MAJORITY DECISION. THE REC-
ORD DOES NOT SUPPORT PLACING THE BLAME 
UPON THE RESPONDENT. 
In the decision of the Court written by Ju~tiee 
rruckett, he states: 
"An important fact in this case is that the Ion~ 
delay in submitting findings and judgment to 
the Court by the prevailing party contributeJ 
to the impossibility of obtaining a transcript of 
the testimony at the time of the appeal." 
In the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett, 
he states: 
"Due to the particular fact situation in this ca~1 
where there han' lwen a number of hearings over 
a period of about sewn years before the judg 
ment was <>nterPd; when' there are essential issm1 
·which it is impos::;iblr: to reciew properly bcca1[,)1 
of the it11sati0factory state of the record; 011J 
where the sitiwtion appears to be largely due Iii 
the fault of Plaintiff, I agree that the ends ol 
justice will be lwst served by remanding the cas1 
for trial." 
Bespondent admits that ordinarily a delay in pre· 
1
Jaring and submitting Findings of Fact and Conclusioni 
of Law and .T udgment to the trial conrt af tPr the rendi 
tion of a Memorandum Decision would be the fault 
01 
e· 
01 
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co11nt->el for the party in whose favor the Memorandum 
Decision was rendered. However, in this case the Find-
ings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not submitted to 
the trial court for signature because immediately after 
tlH· rendition of the Memorandum Decision counsel for 
thl· Ap1wllant requested further hearing, which was 
gTanted, and over a very extended period of time he 
fai!Pd to bring the matter to a hearing, although the 
ease was set down for further hearing on :oeveral occa-
'ions. As the trial court stated, as set out in the tran-
~eript of the hearing on January 11, 1968, at page 12 
of that transcript (R. 292): 
The Court: "And then after this nwrnorandum 
decision was rendered, I sat this matter for fur-
ther hearing at the request of John Farr Larsen 
at least fifteen times, and every time we would 
get ready it was called off, and finally I thought 
the matter was settled or I would have still had 
my notes, but I threw those away a year ago last 
summer." 
Counsel for the Respondent admits that he was len-
ient with the Defendant in attempting to give the De-
fendant an opportunity to be further heard if he cared 
to be lH·arcl, and realizing that the Defendant, during 
part of the time at least, was in the State of Washing-
ton not free to apr>Par for a hearing in Salt Lake City. 
Counse>l for the Respondent has never objected to 
an~1 attempt of the Defendant to have further hearing. 
As late as Aprill 22, 1967, present counsel for the Appel-
lant filed the following motion (R. 45-46): 
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'.'Defendant mov('S the Court for an order grant. 
mg one or more of the following requests a, 
follows: 
" ( 1) That this case be reopened and a trial date 
be granted to complete the unfinished matter~ 
remaining before the Court on August 1, 19Gr1, 
with both parties having leave to amend their 
pleadings, or 
"(2) That Defendant's attorney, Merrill K. Da1i1, 
be granted leave to prepare the Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and to submit 
the same to the Court within twenty days from 
the date that this motion is heard." 
The Respondent filed no objection to the motion to 
reopen and set a trial date to complete any mattert 
which the Defendant cared to introduce, but when counsel 
for the Defendant moved the Court for an order grant· 
ing him leave to prepare Findings, Conclusions and Judg· 
ment, the Respondent submitted Findings, Conclusiom 
and Judgment, because Respondent's counsel was better 
informed as to the case and in a better position to file 
such than counsel for the Appellant. 
Thus, from immediately after the filing of the Memo 
randum Decision until April 24, 1967, the Defendant hai 
been free to submit any matters to the Court whirl 
he cared to do, and no objection of any kind therl'ID 
has been entered by the Respondent. 
-
19 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that justice will best be served 
hy sustaining the decision of the lower court. 
Sueh aetion would certainly be consistent with the 
prior decisions of this court in the following cases: 
Ericbun vs. l11cC1illough, 91 Utah 159, 63 P. 2d 595; 
IJainc Ls. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P. 2d 554; John-
;:;on vs. Peoples Finance and Thrift Company, 2 Utah· 
2d 246, 272 P. 2d 171; and Wilkins vs. Simond, 14 Utah 
2d 406, 385 p. 2d 154. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND 
TAYLOR 
By················································ 
J. Grant Iverson 
Attorneys for Respondent 
